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In this paper we view non-monotonic reasoning as a (special kind of) process. As tem-
poral logic is a common formalism to specify and derive properties of processes, we
introduce a variant of temporal logic as a general speciflcation language for reasoning
processes. We show that it is possible to execute flnite speciflcations in this language,
which leads to executability of a large class of flnite non-monotonic reasoning processes.
c° 1996 Academic Press Limited
1. Introduction
Non-monotonic reasoning is used when an agent wants to draw conclusions about the
world based on its partial knowledge of the world. Classical logic usually permits too
few conclusions for the agent to base its actions upon. Using non-monotonic reasoning
the agent can extend its partial knowledge to a set of hypothetical beliefs. In general
there will be more than one set of beliefs which is a reasonable extension of the (sure)
knowledge. Starting from the set of initial facts the agent can construct all or one of
the possible belief sets using non-monotonic inference rules. It may then commit to one
of these views (and, if needed, change its commitment later), or it may focus on the
intersection of these views.
The construction of a belief set is a stepwise process. The reasoning agent starts with a
set of initial facts to which it applies a number of non-monotonic inference rules to obtain
a larger set of beliefs or conclusions. To this set it may again apply non-monotonic rules
to arrive at a next set of beliefs. Viewed in this way, a non-monotonic reasoning process
is (just) a special kind of process. Temporal logic is recognized as a valuable tool for
specifying processes and reasoning about their properties. For each class of processes, a
difierent version of temporal logic might be most appropriate. As we are interested in
specifying reasoning processes, we will introduce a version of temporal logic suited to
describe reasoning processes. In particular, since a state in a reasoning process should
contain the beliefs or conclusions the reasoning agent has arrived at in that state, we
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propose a temporal epistemic logic as a general speciflcation language for non-monotonic
reasoning processes.
Using temporal logic for specifying processes allows veriflcation and validation of a
process. The beneflt of using an executable temporal logic is that processes specifled in
this logic can also be directly executed, so that reasoning about a process and actually
executing it, can be done in the same language. It will be shown that speciflcations in
our version of temporal logic can be executed, leading to a general algorithm for exe-
cuting non-monotonic reasoning processes. Although there are similarities with existing
executable temporal logics [see .Gabbay (1989), .Fisher (1994); .Fisher and Owens (1995);
.Orgun and Ma (1994)], there are some difierences as well. The complexity of this algo-
rithm is complete in the complexity class where many non-monotonic formalisms reside.
In Section 2 we will formalize the reasoning processes we want to specify using reason-
ing frames and in Section 3 we introduce our temporal speciflcation language for these
reasoning frames. In Section 4 we will show that any flnite speciflcation is executable,
leading to executability of flnite (non-monotonic) reasoning processes. Section 5 contains
conclusions and suggestions for further research.
2. Reasoning Frames
We will start by describing semantically the reasoning processes we would like to
specify, reason about, and execute. Classical (propositional) logic lies at the base of most
non-monotonic formalisms, so we will assume we have a propositional language, L, its
corresponding set of models, Mod , and the (semantic) consequence relation j=µ Mod£L.
Furthermore, for a set X µ L, we deflne the models of X: Mod(X) = fm 2 Mod j m j=
` for all ` 2 Xg; the consequences of a set X µ L are deflned by Cn(X) = f` 2 L j
Mod(X) µ Mod(`)g. For a subset K of Mod , the theory of K is deflned by Th(K) =
f` j m j= ` for all m 2 Kg. A set of models K is called closed if K = Mod(Th(K)), or
equivalently, if K is the set of models of a theory.
Intuitively, the path from initial set of formulae to flnal conclusions can be seen as the
behavior of a reasoning process which starts with the initial formulae, then makes some
non-monotonic inferences to arrive at a new state, again makes some inferences, etc.
possibly ad inflnitum. The flnal conclusions of such a process can be seen as the union
of all conclusions drawn at all stages. A formalization of such reasoning behavior would
have to describe which formulae have been derived at each stage. We will formalize the
notion of state in a reasoning process semantically by the notion of an information state,
which should describe the formulae which the agent has concluded (or which the agent
believes) in that state:
Definition 2.1. (Information State)
1. An information state M over the language L is a non-empty closed set of propo-
sitional models for L, that is, there is a consistent theory of which it is the model
class. The truth of a propositional formula fi in such a state is deflned by:
M j= fi, m j= fi for each m 2M
2. The theory of an information state M is deflned by:
Th(M) = ffi j fi is a propositional formula and M j= fig
3. The reflnement ordering • on information states is deflned by:
M1 •M2 ,M2 µM1
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4. The set of all information states is denoted by IS.
So the theory of an information state contains the formulae the agent believes in that
state. It is important to note that an information state models the partial information
the agent has about the world. Thus it may be the case that a formula fi is not true in an
information state, and its negation is not true either (this happens when the information
state contains a propositional model in which fi is false, and one in which it is true). Using
these notions we can now deflne a reasoning trace as a speciflc type of sequence of such
information states. We assume that the reasoning at least is conservative: conclusions
constructed in earlier stages will be persistent during the reasoning trace. Although
many reasoning processes are flnite (after a while, no new non-monotonic inferences can
be made), for simplicity we will only consider inflnite traces. A process which is flnite
will give rise to a trace which is constant after a certain point. In particular, if the
propositional signature is flnite, all traces will be constant eventually.
Definition 2.2. (Reasoning Trace and Limit Model)
1. A reasoning trace M is a function from the set of natural numbers (N) to IS such
that for all i 2 N:
(a) Mi •Mi+1
(b) Mi =Mi+1 )Mi =Mj for all j ‚ i.
2. The reflnement ordering • on reasoning traces is deflned by:
M• N ,Mi • Ni for all i 2 N.
3. The limit model, limM of a reasoning trace M is deflned by limM = T1i=0Mi.
4. A reasoning trace M is sometimes denoted by (Mi)i2N.
5. A reasoning trace is called flnitely generated if each Th(Mi) is flnitely generated
over Th(M0), i.e., if Th(Mi) = Cn(Th(M0) [ ffiig) for some formulae fii.
Since we assume a countable language L, each theory can be approximated by a chain
of flnitely generated theories. Therefore:
Proposition 2.1.
1. For any reasoning trace its limit is an information state (in particular, it is non-
empty).
2. Any information state is the limit model of a flnitely generated reasoning trace.
A (non-monotonic) type of reasoning can now be described by giving its intended
reasoning traces. Given a set of initial formulae, there may be several traces leading to
difierent conclusion sets. We do, however, assume that the reasoning is deterministic in
the sense that given the set of initial formulae and the flnal conclusion set, the trace
between them is uniquely determined. This can be explained in the sense that at each
stage of the reasoning process all conclusions that possibly can be drawn, actually are
drawn in the next step. Moreover, we do not allow two distinct traces leading to limit
models of which one is a reflnement of the other (non-inclusiveness of traces).
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Definition 2.3. (Reasoning Frame)
1. A reasoning frame is a tuple (L;Mod ; j=; T ) with T a set of reasoning traces such
that for all M and N in T : if M0 = N0 and limM • limN then M = N . For
shortness, sometimes we also call T by itself a reasoning frame.
2. If for all sets of formulae X there exists a traceM in T such that Th(M0) = Cn(X)
then T is called a complete reasoning frame. Otherwise it is called partial. In the
complete case the mapping sending every X µ L to the set of traces fM 2 T j
Th(M0) = Cn(X)g is called the reasoning trace operator related to the reasoning
frame T .
The requirements of conservativity, determinism and non-inclusiveness only talk about
the traces from a given set of initial facts. This certainly does not rule out non-monoton-
icity: if the set of initial facts grows, the limit models of the traces that start with these
initial facts need not increase (and may even decrease). So any form of non-monotonic
reasoning in which conclusion sets are constructed by stepwise increasing the initial facts,
conclusion sets for a given set of initial facts are non-inclusive, and given the initial facts
and a conclusion set there is only one possible trace, can be modelled by a reasoning
frame. As an example we consider default logic:
Example 2.1. (Default Logic) Let D be a set of defaults. For X µ L let E(hX;Di)
denote the set of (Reiter) extensions of the default theory hX;Di. For a given X and
E 2 E(hX;Di) the following reasoning trace M can be associated in a canonical man-
ner: Mi = Mod(Ei) with E0 = Cn(X), and for all i ‚ 0, Ei+1 = Cn(Ei [ f! j
(fi : fl)=! 2 D is applicable at level i g), where a default (fi : fl)=! 2 D is applicable at
level i if fi 2 Ei and :fl 62 E. Note that this is a trace deflnition based on the given set
of defaults D. If we take the set of all these reasoning traces for E 2 E(hX;Di) we get
a partial reasoning frame associated to hX;Di. Taking the union of these frames for all
X µ L we get a complete reasoning frame associated with the set of defaults D.
3. A Temporal Speciflcation Language for Reasoning Frames
A simple observation allows us to flnd a natural description language for reasoning
traces: the steps in a reasoning trace can be viewed as temporal steps. This means that
the transition from an information state to the next one (as the result of a number
of inference steps) can be seen as a temporal one. In this view a trace is a temporal
model based on the set of natural numbers as the °ow of time. An obvious candidate
for describing these models is (some variant of) temporal epistemic logic. However, the
full (tense) logic will turn out to be not completely appropriate: on the one hand it can
describe models which are not traces but on the other hand it is not powerful enough.
Therefore we will introduce a limited fragment of inflnitary tense epistemic logic.
Definition 3.1. (Temporal Epistemic Model)
1. A temporal epistemic model is a function M : N! IS.
2. A temporal epistemic model M is conservative if Mi •Mi+1 for all i 2 N.
3. The reflnement ordering • on temporal epistemic models is deflned by:
M• N ,M0 = N0 and for all i :Mi • Ni.
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4. The limit model, limM, of a temporal epistemic model M is the information state
deflned by limM = T1i=0Mi
5. A temporal epistemic model M is sometimes denoted by (Mi)i2N.
Note that the notion of a temporal epistemic model as such is close to the notion of
a reasoning trace: any reasoning trace can be considered a conservative temporal model
with the property that if it stabilizes one step, then it stabilizes forever. However, in a
temporal epistemic model temporal operators and temporal formulae are interpreted. The
temporal language we will use is a modal propositional language with the operators F ,
G, C, H0 and inflnite conjunctions and disjunctions. An epistemic operator is implicit
in these temporal operators: for instance F` means that sometimes in the future the
reasoning agent will believe (or have derived) `. Furthermore, C` stands for \currently
the agent believes (has derived) `". The truth of a formula ` in a temporal epistemic
model M at time point i, denoted as (M; i) j= ` is deflned inductively:
Definition 3.2. (Temporal Interpretation)
1. For a propositional formula `:
(M; i) j= `,Mi j= `
2. For a formula `:
(M; i) j= F`, there exists j 2 N; j > i such that (M; j) j= `
(M; i) j= G`, for all j 2 N with j > i: (M; j) j= `
(M; i) j= C`, (M; i) j= `
(M; i) j= H0`, (M; 0) j= `
3. For a temporal formula `:
(M; i) j= :`, it is not the case that (M; i) j= `
4. For a set A of temporal formula:
(M; i) j= VA, for all ` 2 A: (M; i) j= `
5. A formula ` is true in a model M, denoted M j= `, if for all i 2 N: (M; i) j= `
6. A set of formulae T is true in a modelM, denotedM j= T , if for all ` 2 T;M j= `.
We call M a model of T .
Furthermore the connectives _ and! are introduced as the usual abbreviations. Note
that for a propositional formula `, C:` is not equivalent to :C`: C:` means that
the agent currently believes :`, whereas :C` means that the agent currently does not
believe `. The C-operator acts like the K-operator in epistemic logic: neither ` nor :`
needs to be true, but always either C` or :C` is true.
The temporal language we have just introduced is still too powerful: we want to use
only a fragment to describe models which can be seen as reasoning traces. So the question
is: which fragment is appropriate for non-monotonic reasoning? As steps in a reasoning
process are taken whenever a number of (non-monotonic) inference steps is used, it seems
that temporal rules should prescribe taking the equivalent of (non-monotonic) inference
steps in the temporal model. So the next question is what the nature is of a generalized
non-monotonic inference step that a reasoning process can execute. A general format of
(temporal) inference rules is fi ! Gfl where fi is a condition for the inference, and fl is
its conclusion: if the condition fi is fulfllled, the conclusion fl can be drawn, and will be
believed henceforth. The condition fi may include reference to the initial facts and the
facts which have been derived earlier (and therefore are still true at the present moment).
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But in non-monotonic reasoning there is often also a kind of global consistency check. In
default logic for instance, a rule is applicable if certain formulae, called the justiflcations,
are consistent with the flnal outcome of the reasoning process (called an extension), which
means they should be consistent throughout the entire reasoning process. Consistency of
a formula usually means that its negation should not be true. Therefore we also allow
conditions which state that a certain formula should never (in the future of the reasoning
process) be true.
Definition 3.3. (Reasoning Theories)
1. A formula is called a (non-monotonic) reasoning formula if it is of the form
fi ^ fl ^ ` ^ ˆ ! G°; where
fi =
VfH0† j † 2 Ag for a set of propositional formulae A.
fl =
Vf:H0– j – 2 Bg for a set of propositional formulae B.
` =
Vf:Fµ j µ 2 Dg for a set of propositional formulae D.
ˆ =
VfC‡ j ‡ 2 Fg for a set of propositional formulae F .
° is a propositional formula.
A reasoning formula is called flnitary if all sets of formulae involved are flnite;
otherwise it is called inflnitary.
2. A set Th of reasoning formulae is called a theory of reasoning. It is called flnitary
if all its elements are; otherwise it is called inflnitary.
So a reasoning formula prescribes the truth of a formula in the future based on knowl-
edge of initial facts, truth of current facts and consistency of facts in the future (if :Fµ
is true, then µ is never believed in the future, so :µ remains consistent with the agent’s
beliefs throughout the future).
Definition 3.4. (Conservativity) The theory Cons = fCfi ! Gfi j fi a proposi-
tional formulag is a theory of reasoning expressing conservativity of temporal models.
A theory of reasoning prescribes that certain formulae have to be believed (derived) in
the future, analogously to inference steps. But what about facts which become known at
a point in time spontaneously, that is without any inference rule prescribing their truth?
We should have a way to make sure that this does not happen: we want the models to
have minimal information in the sense that nothing becomes known if there are no rules
saying so [see also .Shoham (1988); .Kraus et al. (1990)]. This leads to the following notion
of minimal models:
Definition 3.5. (Minimal Temporal Models) A temporal epistemic model M is
called a minimal model of a theory Th if it is a model of Th and for any model N of
Th, if N •M then N =M.
A minimal model of a theory is a model for which there are no smaller models of the
theory, so they contain a minimum of information.
Given the fragment of temporal logic we have deflned, a natural property to investigate
is whether this fragment is suited for describing reasoning traces. From now on we will
assume that any theory includes the theory Cons described in Deflnition 3.4. The flrst
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result is that all minimal models of any theory are reasoning traces. On the other hand,
any reasoning frame is the set of minimal models of a theory of reasoning:
Theorem 3.1.
1. For any theory of reasoning Th its minimal models constitute a (partial) reasoning
frame.
2. For any (partial) reasoning frame T there exists a theory of reasoning whose min-
imal models are exactly T . If there is only a flnite number of atomic proposition
symbols, then this theory of reasoning can be taken flnite and flnitary.
Now we give an explicit theory of reasoning for the reasoning frame associated with a
default theory as described in Example 2.1 [see .Engelfriet and Treur (1993)]:
Example 3.1. (Default Logic) Given a default theory ¢ = hX;Di, deflne its the-
ory of reasoning T (¢) by: T (¢) = fCfi ^ :F:fl ! G° j (fi; fl)=° 2 Dg [ fCfi j
fi 2 Xg[Cons. Then the minimal models of T (¢) constitute the partial reasoning frame
associated to ¢. Each minimal model of T (¢) corresponds with an extension of ¢.
Any form of non-monotonic reasoning which can be modeled by a reasoning frame (thus
any form satisfying conservativity, determinism and non-inclusiveness), can be described
by a theory of reasoning. The question arises whether this theory can always be chosen
flnite. For deafult logic, this is the case if the default theory is flnite.
4. Executing Theories of Reasoning
In order to execute a theory of reasoning we interpret its temporal rules as inference
rules. If the condition of such a rule is met, we introduce its conclusion at the next step.
The condition of the rule pertaining to the initial facts and the present can be checked in
a straightforward manner. The only problem are the consistency checks. The way to deal
with them is to: (a) either assume they will be met and add the conclusion. In this case
we will have to check at all later steps that they are still met; (b) otherwise we assume
they are not met and do not add the conclusion. In this case the consistency must be
violated at some later time. If this does not happen then the execution is not correct. If
the theory of reasoning is inflnite, it is in general not possible at any point in time to be
sure we are executing correctly.
Notice that a reasoning formula is not of the form \PAST implies FUTURE", a form
used often for executable temporal logic [see .Gabbay (1989)]. We could move the con-
sistency checks to the right of the implication. Using the notation of Deflnition 3.3 we
would obtain a rule fi ^ fl ^ ˆ ! G° _ WfFµ j µ 2 Dg, which is clearly in the desired
format. To execute this rule if the conditions are met, we could either introduce ° at the
next moment in time, or introduce one of the elements of D at any future time point.
But this is not the correct way of executing such a formula, since the consistency checks
are meant to be declarative and not imperative. So instead of the slogan \declarative
past implies imperative future" (.Gabbay, 1989) we use the slogan \declarative past and
future imply imperative future".
We will now informally describe the general algorithm for executing a theory of rea-
soning Th. We assume that we have a set of initial facts.
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Algorithm 4.1.
1. Mark all rules as unused, set t to 0.
2. If the current facts are contradictory, backtrack to the previous time point.
3. Check all constraints never true(µ). If µ is entailed by the current facts, backtrack
to the previous time point.
4. For each unused rule fi ^ fl ^ ` ^ ˆ ! G°, where
fi =
VfH0† j † 2 Ag for a set of propositional formulae A;
fl =
Vf:H0– j – 2 Bg for a set of propositional formulae B;
` =
Vf:Fµ j µ 2 Dg for a set of propositional formulae D;
ˆ =
VfC‡ j ‡ 2 Fg for a set of propositional formulae F ;
° is a propositional formula;
do: If all formulae in F are entailed by the current facts, and all formulae in A are
entailed by the initial facts, and all formulae in B are not entailed by the initial
facts then this rule is applicable: mark this rule as used and do either of:
† introduce next(°) and constraints never true(µ) for each µ 2 D, or
† introduce constraints sometimes true(D).
If we backtracked to this time point, make a choice for all the applicable rules at
this time point which has not been made before. If this is not possible, backtrack one
more step. If this is not possible (t = 0) then abort.
5. t := t + 1; for each formula next(°), introduce ° and delete next(°); If there are
no formulae next(°), check for each constraint sometimes true(D) whether some
µ 2 D is entailed by the current facts; if not, backtrack one step; Goto 2.
If for all constraints sometimes true(D), some µ 2 D is entailed by the facts at
some point in time, the execution of the algorithm is called correct.
As mentioned before, if at each step new formulae are added, we can never be sure
during execution, if the execution will be correct. However in case the theory of reasoning
is flnite, there will be a point in time when no new facts are added: then the execution
will always be correct. This is always the case when the propositional language contains
a flnite number of atoms: then there is a flnite number of non-equivalent propositional
formulae; if this number is n, then after n steps of the algorithm, no new facts can be
added. For correct executions we have the following:
Theorem 4.1. Let a theory of reasoning Th be given. For an execution of the algorithm
for Th, let Ti denote the set of propositional formulae derived at time t = i. Deflne
a reasoning trace (Mi)i2N by Mi = Mod(Ti). Let T be the set of these traces for all
possible correct executions of the algorithm for Th. Then T is exactly the set of minimal
models of Th.
So in the case of a flnite theory of reasoning, our algorithm can construct precisely
its minimal models. Since any reasoning process described by a reasoning frame has a
theory of reasoning describing it, which can be executed by our algorithm, we have a
general algorithm for executing these processes. Applying this algorithm to the theory
of reasoning of a default theory, we obtain an algorithm very similar to the ones meant
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especially for default logic: it picks a subset of so-called generating defaults, and checks
whether it indeed induces an extension.
Using this algorithm to obtain either one or all of the minimal models of a theory of
reasoning, one can verify various properties of the reasoning process described by the
theory of reasoning. For instance it can be checked whether a certain formula is derived
in one or in all possible runs. Thus for non-monotonic reasoning processes, sceptical and
credulous entailment can be calculated. It can be shown (using the above algorithm)
that the complexity of sceptical entailment using theories of reasoning is complete inQP
2 . This is the complexity of sceptical entailment of many non-monotonic formalisms
like autoepistemic logic, McDermott and Doyle’s non-monotonic logic and non-monotonic
logic N [see .Engelfriet (1996)].
A special class of theories of reasoning is obtained when we do not allow consistency
checks (the set D in Deflnition 3.3 is empty). The induced reasoning process will then
be monotonic, and the algorithm will be much more e–cient.
In speciflc instances of theories of reasoning one would like to make the algorithm more
e–cient. This can be done by using heuristic knowledge to make smart choices at each
point in time. In particular, if at the current point in time one of the µ 2 D is already
entailed by the facts, only the second choice in the algorithm makes sense. In the case
of default logic, one could use priorities between default rules or speciflcity of rules to
restrict the number of possible choices [see .Brewka (1994)]. The set of possible runs of
our algorithm can be parameterized by selection functions. Such functions describe the
choices which have to be made at each point in time: [in a similar fashion as in .Tan and
.Treur .(1992)]. Then the \good" selection functions make use of heuristic knowledge to
guide the reasoning process.
5. Conclusions and Further Research
The formalism of temporal logic is used to specify and verify processes in general.
If a class of processes can be specifled accurately by a form of temporal logic which
can be executed, we have a general execution mechanism for this class. In this paper
we studied the class of non-monotonic reasoning processes [see also .Engelfriet et al.
(1995) and .Engelfriet and Treur (1996)]. These processes can be described semantically
by the reasoning traces they produce. Viewing these traces as temporal models, they can
be specifled by temporal rules. We have shown that a fragment of inflnitary temporal
epistemic logic is suitable for describing any set of traces [see .Engelfriet and Treur (1993)
and .Engelfriet and Treur (1994) for speciflcations of a number of speciflc types of non-
monotonic reasoning]. In the (important) case when the signature is flnite we have given
an algorithm which can execute any speciflcation of reasoning. Although the execution of
temporal rules is similar to existing executable temporal logics, the consistency checks are
treated difierently. They are treated as declarative tests in the future, not as imperative
commands for the future.
The most important difierence between our framework for non-monotonic reasoning
and the framework developed by Shoham, Kraus, Lehmann, Magidor, Makinson and
others [see e.g. .Kraus et al. (1990) and .Shoham (1988)] is that we explicitly also want to
model the dynamics of reasoning, whereas the other approaches only focus on the static
aspects, namely the initial facts and the conclusions.
As our speciflcation language describes reasoning processes, a natural question to in-
vestigate is whether it is possible to flnd a generic meta-level architecture capable of ex-
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ecuting speciflcations of reasoning. In such an architecture, the meta-level should check
the rules for applicability and select the conclusions to be added at the object-level.
Heuristic knowledge at the meta-level can be used to control the selection of conclusions.
There should be an easy and natural way to translate speciflcations of reasoning into
rules to be used by this architecture, thus instantiating the generic architecture.
Speciflcation languages for such meta-level architectures can be found in the research
on formal speciflcation languages for complex reasoning systems [see .Treur and Wetter
(1993)]. One of these languages is DESIRE [see also .Langevelde et al. (1992), .Gavrila
and Treur (1994)]; in .Tan and Treur (1992), it is shown how DESIRE can be used
to specify a reasoning system creating non-monotonic reasoning patterns. Here explicit
control knowledge is (required to be) added at the meta-level; this control knowledge
specifles a selection function on (possible) default conclusions. The software environment
supporting DESIRE provides (automatically generated) implementation code (PROLOG
code that can be executed).
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